Legislación
US (United States) Code. Title 11. Chapter 5: Creditors, the debtor and the state
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11 USC CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE 01/06/03
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TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
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CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
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SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
Sec.
501. Filing of proofs of claims or interests.
502. Allowance of claims or interests.
503. Allowance of administrative expenses.
504. Sharing of compensation.
505. Determination of tax liability.
506. Determination of secured status.
507. Priorities.
508. Effect of distribution other than under this title.
509. Claims of codebtors.
510. Subordination.
SUBCHAPTER II - DEBTOR'S DUTIES AND BENEFITS
521. Debtor's duties.
522. Exemptions.
523. Exceptions to discharge.
524. Effect of discharge.
525. Protection against discriminatory treatment.
SUBCHAPTER III - THE ESTATE
541. Property of the estate.
542. Turnover of property to the estate.
543. Turnover of property by a custodian.
544. Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to certain creditors
and purchasers.
545. Statutory liens.
546. Limitations on avoiding powers.
547. Preferences.
548. Fraudulent transfers and obligations.
549. Postpetition transactions.
550. Liability of transferee of avoided transfer.
551. Automatic preservation of avoided transfer.
552. Postpetition effect of security interest.
553. Setoff.
554. Abandonment of property of the estate.
555. Contractual right to liquidate a securities contract.
556. Contractual right to liquidate a commodity contract or forward
contract. (FOOTNOTE 1)
(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. Does not conform to section
catchline.
557. Expedited determination of interests in, and abandonment or
other disposition of grain assets.
558. Defenses of the estate.
559. Contractual right to liquidate a repurchase agreement.
560. Contractual right to terminate a swap agreement.
AMENDMENTS
1990 - Pub. L. 101-311, title I, Sec. 106(b), June 25, 1990, 104
Stat. 268, added item 560.
1986 - Pub. L. 99-554, title II, Sec. 283(q), Oct. 27, 1986, 100
Stat. 3118, amended items 557 to 559 generally, substituting
''interests in, and abandonment or other disposition of grain
assets'' for ''in and disposition of grain'' in item 557.
1984 - Pub. L. 98-353, title III, Sec. 352(b), 396(b), 470(b),
July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 361, 366, 380, added items 557, 558, and
559.
1982 - Pub. L. 97-222, Sec. 6(b), July 27, 1982, 96 Stat. 237,
added items 555 and 556.
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CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This chapter is referred to in section 103 of this title; title
15 section 78fff.
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11 USC SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS 01/06/03
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TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
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SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
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11 USC Sec. 501 01/06/03
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TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
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Sec. 501. Filing of proofs of claims or interests
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(a) A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof of
claim. An equity security holder may file a proof of interest.
(b) If a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor's
claim, an entity that is liable to such creditor with the debtor,
or that has secured such creditor, may file a proof of such claim.
(c) If a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor's
claim, the debtor or the trustee may file a proof of such claim.
(d) A claim of a kind specified in section 502(e)(2), 502(f),
502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title may be filed under
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section the same as if such
claim were a claim against the debtor and had arisen before the
date of the filing of the petition.
-SOURCE-
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2578; Pub. L. 98-353, title
III, Sec. 444, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 373.)
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HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS
The House amendment adopts section 501(b) of the Senate amendment
leaving the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure free to determine where a
proof of claim must be filed.
Section 501(c) expands language contained in section 501(c) of
the House bill and Senate amendment to permit the debtor to file a
proof of claim if a creditor does not timely file a proof of the
creditor's claim in a case under title 11.
The House amendment deletes section 501(e) of the Senate
amendment as a matter to be left to the rules of bankruptcy
procedure. It is anticipated that the rules will enable
governmental units, like other creditors, to have a reasonable time
to file proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases.
For purposes of section 501, a proof of ''interest'' includes the
interest of a general or limited partner in a partnership, the
interest of a proprietor in a sole proprietorship, or the interest
of a common or preferred stockholder in a corporation.
SENATE REPORT NO. 95-989
This section governs the means by which creditors and equity
security holders present their claims or interests to the court.
Subsection (a) permits a creditor to file a proof of claim or
interest. An indenture trustee representing creditors may file a
proof of claim on behalf of the creditors he represents.
This subsection is permissive only, and does not require filing
of a proof of claim by any creditor. It permits filing where some
purpose would be served, such as where a claim that appears on a
list filed under proposed 11 U.S.C. 924 or 1111 was incorrectly
stated or listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, where a
creditor with a lien is undersecured and asserts a claim for the
balance of the debt owed him (his unsecured claim, as determined
under proposed 11 U.S.C. 506(a)), or in a liquidation case where
there will be a distribution of assets to the holders of allowed
claims. In other instances, such as in no-asset liquidation cases,
in situations where a secured creditor does not assert any claim
against the estate and a determination of his claim is not made
under proposed 11 U.S.C. 506, or in situations where the claim
asserted would be subordinated and the creditor would not recover
from the estate in any event, filing of a proof of claim may simply
not be necessary. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and practice
under the law will guide creditors as to when filing is necessary
and when it may be dispensed with. In general, however, unless a
claim is listed in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 case and allowed as a
result of the list, a proof of claim will be a prerequisite to
allowance for unsecured claims, including priority claims and the
unsecured portion of a claim asserted by the holder of a lien.
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will set the time limits, the
form, and the procedure for filing, which will determine whether
claims are timely or tardily filed. The rules governing time
limits for filing proofs of claims will continue to apply under
section 405(d) of the bill. These provide a 6-month-bar date for
the filing of tax claims.
Subsection (b) permits a codebtor, surety, or guarantor to file a
proof of claim on behalf of the creditor to which he is liable if
the creditor does not timely file a proof of claim.
In liquidation and individual repayment plan cases, the trustee
or the debtor may file a proof of claim under subsection (c) if the
creditor does not timely file. The purpose of this subsection is
mainly to protect the debtor if the creditor's claim is
nondischargeable. If the creditor does not file, there would be no
distribution on the claim, and the debtor would have a greater debt
to repay after the case is closed than if the claim were paid in
part or in full in the case or under the plan.
Subsection (d) governs the filing of claims of the kind specified
in subsections (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j) of proposed 11 U.S.C.
502. The separation of this provision from the other claim-filing
provisions in this section is intended to indicate that claims of
the kind specified, which do not become fixed or do not arise until
after the commencement of the case, must be treated differently for
filing purposes such as the bar date for filing claims. The rules
will provide for later filing of claims of these kinds.
Subsection (e) gives governmental units (including tax
authorities) at least six months following the date for the first
meeting of creditors in a chapter 7 or chapter 13 case within which
to file proof of claims.
AMENDMENTS
1984 - Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98-353 inserted ''502(e)(2),''.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 98-353 effective with respect to cases filed
90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98-353,
set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
CHILD SUPPORT CREDITORS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES; APPEARANCE BEFORE
COURT
Pub. L. 103-394, title III, Sec. 304(g), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat.
4134, provided that: ''Child support creditors or their
representatives shall be permitted to appear and intervene without
charge, and without meeting any special local court rule
requirement for attorney appearances, in any bankruptcy case or
proceeding in any bankruptcy court or district court of the United
States if such creditors or representatives file a form in such
court that contains information detailing the child support debt,
its status, and other characteristics.''
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SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 502, 506, 726, 727, 901,
925, 944, 1111, 1141 of this title.
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11 USC Sec. 502 01/06/03
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TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
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Sec. 502. Allowance of claims or interests
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(a) A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section
501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest,
including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is
a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (f), (g), (h) and
(i) of this section, if such objection to a claim is made, the
court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of
such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date
of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such
amount, except to the extent that -
(1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property
of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason
other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured;
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest;
(3) if such claim is for a tax assessed against property of the
estate, such claim exceeds the value of the interest of the
estate in such property;
(4) if such claim is for services of an insider or attorney of
the debtor, such claim exceeds the reasonable value of such
services;
(5) such claim is for a debt that is unmatured on the date of
the filing of the petition and that is excepted from discharge
under section 523(a)(5) of this title;
(6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages
resulting from the termination of a lease of real property, such
claim exceeds -
(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration,
for the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three
years, of the remaining term of such lease, following the
earlier of -
(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the
lessee surrendered, the leased property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without
acceleration, on the earlier of such dates;
(7) if such claim is the claim of an employee for damages
resulting from the termination of an employment contract, such
claim exceeds -
(A) the compensation provided by such contract, without
acceleration, for one year following the earlier of -
(i) the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) the date on which the employer directed the employee
to terminate, or such employee terminated, performance under
such contract; plus
(B) any unpaid compensation due under such contract, without
acceleration, on the earlier of such dates;
(8) such claim results from a reduction, due to late payment,
in the amount of an otherwise applicable credit available to the
debtor in connection with an employment tax on wages, salaries,
or commissions earned from the debtor; or
(9) proof of such claim is not timely filed, except to the
extent tardily filed as permitted under paragraph (1), (2), or
(3) of section 726(a) of this title or under the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, except that a claim of a governmental unit
shall be timely filed if it is filed before 180 days after the
date of the order for relief or such later time as the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may provide.
(c) There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this
section -
(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or
liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the
administration of the case; or
(2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance.
(d) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the
court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is
recoverable under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or
that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f),
522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless
such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any
such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under
section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title.
(e)(1) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this
section and paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall
disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity
that is liable with the debtor on or has secured the claim of a
creditor, to the extent that -
(A) such creditor's claim against the estate is disallowed;
(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent
as of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for
reimbursement or contribution; or
(C) such entity asserts a right of subrogation to the rights of
such creditor under section 509 of this title.
(2) A claim for reimbursement or contribution of such an entity
that becomes fixed after the commencement of the case shall be
determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c)
of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) of this
section, the same as if such claim had become fixed before the date
of the filing of the petition.
(f) In an involuntary case, a claim arising in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business or financial affairs after the
commencement of the case but before the earlier of the appointment
of a trustee and the order for relief shall be determined as of the
date such claim arises, and shall be allowed under subsection (a),
(b), or (c) of this section or disallowed under subsection (d) or
(e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before
the date of the filing of the petition.
(g) A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this
title or under a plan under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title,
of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor that has
not been assumed shall be determined, and shall be allowed under
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section or disallowed under
subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim
had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.
(h) A claim arising from the recovery of property under section
522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be
allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or
disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as
if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the
petition.
(i) A claim that does not arise until after the commencement of
the case for a tax entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8) of
this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under
subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim
had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.
(j) A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be
reconsidered for cause. A reconsidered claim may be allowed or
disallowed according to the equities of the case. Reconsideration
of a claim under this subsection does not affect the validity of
any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an
allowed claim on account of such allowed claim that is not
reconsidered, but if a reconsidered claim is allowed and is of the
same class as such holder's claim, such holder may not receive any
additional payment or transfer from the estate on account of such
holder's allowed claim until the holder of such reconsidered and
allowed claim receives payment on account of such claim
proportionate in value to that already received by such other
holder. This subsection does not alter or modify the trustee's
right to recover from a creditor any excess payment or transfer
made to such creditor.
-SOURCE-
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2579; Pub. L. 98-353, title
III, Sec. 445, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 373; Pub. L. 99-554, title
II, Sec. 257(j), 283(f), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3117; Pub.
L. 103-394, title II, Sec. 213(a), title III, Sec. 304(h)(1), Oct.
22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4125, 4134.)
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HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS
The House amendment adopts a compromise position in section
502(a) between H.R. 8200, as passed by the House, and the Senate
amendment. Section 502(a) has been modified to make clear that a
party in interest includes a creditor of a partner in a partnership
that is a debtor under chapter 7. Since the trustee of the
partnership is given an absolute claim against the estate of each
general partner under section 723(c), creditors of the partner must
have standing to object to claims against the partnership at the
partnership level because no opportunity will be afforded at the
partner's level for such objection.
The House amendment contains a provision in section 502(b)(1)
that requires disallowance of a claim to the extent that such claim
is unenforceable against the debtor and unenforceable against
property of the debtor. This is intended to result in the
disallowance of any claim for deficiency by an undersecured
creditor on a non-recourse loan or under a State antideficiency
law, special provision for which is made in section 1111, since
neither the debtor personally, nor the property of the debtor is
liable for such a deficiency. Similarly claims for usurious
interest or which could be barred by an agreement between the
creditor and the debtor would be disallowed.
Section 502(b)(7)(A) represents a compromise between the House
bill and the Senate amendment. The House amendment takes the
provision in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House of Representatives
but increases the percentage from 10 to 15 percent.
As used in section 502(b)(7), the phrase ''lease of real
property'' applies only to a ''true'' or ''bona fide'' lease and
does not apply to financing leases of real property or interests
therein, or to leases of such property which are intended as
security.
Historically, the limitation on allowable claims of lessors of
real property was based on two considerations. First, the amount
of the lessor's damages on breach of a real estate lease was
considered contingent and difficult to prove. Partly for this
reason, claims of a lessor of real estate were not provable prior
to the 1934 amendments, to the Bankruptcy Act (former title 11).
Second, in a true lease of real property, the lessor retains all
risks and benefits as to the value of the real estate at the
termination of the lease. Historically, it was, therefore,
considered equitable to limit the claims of real estate lessor.
However, these considerations are not present in ''lease
financing'' transactions where, in substance, the ''lease''
involves a sale of the real estate and the rental payments are in
substance the payment of principal and interest on a secured loan
or sale. In a financing lease the lessor is essentially a secured
or unsecured creditor (depending upon whether his interest is
perfected or not) of the debtor, and the lessor's claim should not
be subject to the 502(b)(7) limitation. Financing ''leases'' are
in substance installment sales or loans. The ''lessors'' are
essentially sellers or lenders and should be treated as such for
purposes of the bankruptcy law.
Whether a ''lease'' is true or bona fide lease or, in the
alternative a financing ''lease'' or a lease intended as security,
depends upon the circumstances of each case. The distinction
between a true lease and a financing transaction is based upon the
economic substance of the transaction and not, for example, upon
the locus of title, the form of the transaction or the fact that
the transaction is denominated as a ''lease.'' The fact that the
lessee, upon compliance with the terms of the lease, becomes or has
the option to become the owner of the leased property for no
additional consideration or for nominal consideration indicates
that the transaction is a financing lease or lease intended as
security. In such cases, the lessor has no substantial interest in
the leased property at the expiration of the lease term. In
addition, the fact that the lessee assumes and discharges
substantially all the risks and obligations ordinarily attributed
to the outright ownership of the property is more indicative of a
financing transaction than of a true lease. The rental payments in
such cases are in substance payments of principal and interest
either on a loan secured by the leased real property or on the
purchase of the leased real property. See, e.g., Financial
Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 13 and SEC Reg. S-X, 17
C.F.R. sec. 210.3-16(q) (1977); cf. First National Bank of Chicago
v. Irving Trust Co., 74 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1934); and Albenda and
Lief, ''Net Lease Financing Transactions Under the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973,'' 30 Business Lawyer, 713 (1975).
Section 502(c) of the House amendment presents a compromise
between similar provisions contained in the House bill and the
Senate amendment. The compromise language is consistent with an
amendment to the definition of ''claim'' in section 104(4)(B) of
the House amendment and requires estimation of any right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right to payment. To the extent language in the House
and Senate reports indicate otherwise, such language is expressly
overruled.
Section 502(e) of the House amendment contains language modifying
a similar section in the House bill and Senate amendment. Section
502(e)(1) states the general rule requiring the court to disallow
any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is
liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, the claim of a
creditor to any extent that the creditor's claim against the estate
is disallowed. This adopts a policy that a surety's claim for
reimbursement or contribution is entitled to no better status than
the claim of the creditor assured by such surety. Section
502(e)(1)(B) alternatively disallows any claim for reimbursement or
contribution by a surety to the extent such claim is contingent as
of the time of allowance. Section 502(e)(2) is clear that to the
extent a claim for reimbursement or contribution becomes fixed
after the commencement of the case that it is to be considered a
prepetition claim for purposes of allowance. The combined effect
of sections 502(e)(1)(B) and 502(e)(2) is that a surety or codebtor
is generally permitted a claim for reimbursement or contribution to
the extent the surety or codebtor has paid the assured party at the
time of allowance. Section 502(e)(1)(C) alternatively indicates
that a claim for reimbursement or contribution of a surety or
codebtor is disallowed to the extent the surety or codebtor
requests subrogation under section 509 with respect to the rights
of the assured party. Thus, the surety or codebtor has a choice;
to the extent a claim for contribution or reimbursement would be
advantageous, such as in the case where such a claim is secured, a
surety or codebtor may opt for reimbursement or contribution under
section 502(e). On the other hand, to the extent the claim for such
surety or codebtor by way of subrogation is more advantageous, such
as where such claim is secured, the surety may elect subrogation
under section 509.
The section changes current law by making the election identical
in all other respects. To the extent a creditor's claim is
satisfied by a surety or codebtor, other creditors should not
benefit by the surety's inability to file a claim against the
estate merely because such surety or codebtor has failed to pay
such creditor's claim in full. On the other hand, to the extent
the creditor's claim against the estate is otherwise disallowed,
the surety or codebtor should not be entitled to increased rights
by way of reimbursement or contribution, to the detriment of
competing claims of other unsecured creditors, than would be
realized by way of subrogation.
While the foregoing scheme is equitable with respect to other
unsecured creditors of the debtor, it is desirable to preserve
present law to the extent that a surety or codebtor is not
permitted to compete with the creditor he has assured until the
assured party's claim has paid in full. Accordingly, section
509(c) of the House amendment subordinates both a claim by way of
subrogation or a claim for reimbursement or contribution of a
surety or codebtor to the claim of the assured party until the
assured party's claim is paid in full.
Section 502(h) of the House amendment expands similar provisions
contained in the House bill and the Senate amendment to indicate
that any claim arising from the recovery of property under section
522(i), 550, or 553 shall be determined as though it were a
prepetition claim.
Section 502(i) of the House amendment adopts a provision
contained in section 502(j) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House but
that was not contained in the Senate amendment.
Section 502(i) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House, but was not
included in the Senate amendment, is deleted as a matter to be left
to the bankruptcy tax bill next year.
The House amendment deletes section 502(i) of the Senate bill but
adopts the policy of that section to a limited extent for
confirmation of a plan of reorganization in section 1111(b) of the
House amendment.
Section 502(j) of the House amendment is new. The provision
codifies section 57k of the Bankruptcy Act (section 93(k) of former
title 11).
Allowance of Claims or Interest: The House amendment adopts
section 502(b)(9) of the House bill which disallows any tax claim
resulting from a reduction of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) credit (sec. 3302 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.
3302)) on account of a tardy contribution to a State unemployment
fund if the contribution is attributable to ways or other
compensation paid by the debtor before bankruptcy. The Senate
amendment allowed this reduction, but would have subordinated it to
other claims in the distribution of the estate's assets by treating
it as a punitive (nonpecuniary loss) penalty. The House amendment
would also not bar reduction of the FUTA credit on account of a
trustee's late payment of a contribution to a State unemployment
fund if the contribution was attributable to a trustee's payment of
compensation earned from the estate.
Section 511 of the Senate amendment is deleted. Its substance is
adopted in section 502(b)(9) of the House amendment which reflects
an identical provision contained in H.R. 8200 as passed by the
House.
SENATE REPORT NO. 95-989
A proof of claim or interest is prima facie evidence of the claim
or interest. Thus, it is allowed under subsection (a) unless a
party in interest objects. The rules and case law will determine
who is a party in interest for purposes of objection to allowance.
The case law is well developed on this subject today. As a result
of the change in the liability of a general partner's estate for
the debts of this partnership, see proposed 11 U.S.C. 723, the
category of persons that are parties in interest in the partnership
case will be expanded to include a creditor of a partner against
whose estate the trustee of the partnership estate may proceed
under proposed 11 U.S.C. 723(c).
Subsection (b) prescribes the grounds on which a claim may be
disallowed. The court will apply these standards if there is an
objection to a proof of claim. The burden of proof on the issue of
allowance is left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Under the
current chapter XIII rules, a creditor is required to prove that
his claim is free from usury, rule 13-301. It is expected that the
rules will make similar provision for both liquidation and
individual repayment plan cases. See Bankruptcy Act Sec. 656(b)
(section 1056(b) of former title 11); H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st
sess., sec. 6-104(a) (1975).
Paragraph (1) requires disallowance if the claim is unenforceable
against the debtor for any reason (such as usury,
unconscionability, or failure of consideration) other than because
it is contingent or unmatured. All such contingent or unmatured
claims are to be liquidated by the bankruptcy court in order to
afford the debtor complete bankruptcy relief; these claims are
generally not provable under present law.
Paragraph (2) requires disallowance to the extent that the claim
is for unmatured interest as of the date of the petition. Whether
interest is matured or unmatured on the date of bankruptcy is to be
determined without reference to any ipso facto or bankruptcy clause
in the agreement creating the claim. Interest disallowed under
this paragraph includes postpetition interest that is not yet due
and payable, and any portion of prepaid interest that represents an
original discounting of the claim, yet that would not have been
earned on the date of bankruptcy. For example, a claim on a $1,000
note issued the day before bankruptcy would only be allowed to the
extent of the cash actually advanced. If the original discount was
10 percent so that the cash advanced was only $900, then
notwithstanding the face amount of note, only $900 would be
allowed. If $900 was advanced under the note some time before
bankruptcy, the interest component of the note would have to be
prorated and disallowed to the extent it was for interest after the
commencement of the case.
Section 502(b) thus contains two principles of present law.
First, interest stops accruing at the date of the filing of the
petition, because any claim for unmatured interest is disallowed
under this paragraph. Second, bankruptcy operates as the
acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the
debtor. One unarticulated reason for this is that the discounting
factor for claims after the commencement of the case is equivalent
to contractual interest rate on the claim. Thus, this paragraph
does not cause disallowance of claims that have not been discounted
to a present value because of the irrebuttable presumption that the
discounting rate and the contractual interest rate (even a zero
interest rate) are equivalent.
Paragraph (3) requires disallowance of a claim to the extent that
the creditor may offset the claim against a debt owing to the
debtor. This will prevent double recovery, and permit the claim to
be filed only for the balance due. This follows section 68 of the
Bankruptcy Act (section 108 of former title 11).
Paragraph (4) requires disallowance of a property tax claim to
the extent that the tax due exceeds the value of the property.
This too follows current law to the extent the property tax is ad
valorem.
Paragraph (5) prevents overreaching by the debtor's attorneys and
concealing of assets by debtors. It permits the court to examine
the claim of a debtor's attorney independently of any other
provision of this subsection, and to disallow it to the extent that
it exceeds the reasonable value of the attorneys' services.
Postpetition alimony, maintenance or support claims are
disallowed under paragraph (6). They are to be paid from the
debtor's postpetition property, because the claims are
nondischargeable.
Paragraph (7), derived from current law, limits the damages
allowable to a landlord of the debtor. The history of this
provision is set out at length in Oldden v. Tonto Realty Co., 143
F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944). It is designed to compensate the landlord
for his loss while not permitting a claim so large (based on a
long-term lease) as to prevent other general unsecured creditors
from recovering a dividend from the estate. The damages a landlord
may assert from termination of a lease are limited to the rent
reserved for the greater of one year or ten percent of the
remaining lease term, not to exceed three years, after the earlier
of the date of the filing of the petition and the date of surrender
or repossession in a chapter 7 case and 3 years lease payments in a
chapter 9, 11, or 13 case. The sliding scale formula for chapter 7
cases is new and designed to protect the long-term lessor. This
subsection does not apply to limit administrative expense claims
for use of the leased premises to which the landlord is otherwise
entitled.
This paragraph will not overrule Oldden, or the proposition for
which it has been read to stand: To the extent that a landlord has
a security deposit in excess of the amount of his claim allowed
under this paragraph, the excess comes into the estate. Moreover,
his allowed claim is for his total damages, as limited by this
paragraph. By virtue of proposed 11 U.S.C. 506(a) and 506(d), the
claim will be divided into a secured portion and an unsecured
portion in those cases in which the deposit that the landlord holds
is less than his damages. As under Oldden, he will not be
permitted to offset his actual damages against his security deposit
and then claim for the balance under this paragraph. Rather, his
security deposit will be applied in satisfaction of the claim that
is allowed under this paragraph.
As used in section 502(b)(7), the phrase ''lease of real
property'' applies only to a ''true'' or ''bona fide'' lease and
does not apply to financing leases of real property or interests
therein, or to leases of such property which are intended as
security.
Historically, the limitation on allowable claims of lessors of
real property was based on two considerations. First, the amount
of the lessors damages on breach of a real estate lease was
considered contingent and difficult to prove. Partly for this
reason, claims of a lessor of real estate were not provable prior
to the 1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (former title 11).
Second, in a true lease of real property, the lessor retains all
risk and benefits as to the value of the real estate at the
termination of the lease. Historically, it was, therefore,
considered equitable to limit the claims of a real estate lessor.
However, these considerations are not present in ''lease
financing'' transactions where, in substance, the ''lease''
involves a sale of the real estate and the rental payments are in
substance the payment of principal and interest on a secured loan
or sale. In a financing lease the lessor is essentially a secured
or unsecured creditor (depending upon whether his interest is
perfected or not) of the debtor, and the lessor's claim should not
be subject to the 502(b)(7) limitation. Financing ''leases'' are
in substance installment sales or loans. The ''lessors'' are
essentially sellers or lenders and should be treated as such for
purposes of the bankruptcy law.
Whether a ''lease'' is true or bona fide lease or, in the
alternative, a financing ''lease'' or a lease intended as security,
depends upon the circumstances of each case. The distinction
between a true lease and a financing transaction is based upon the
economic substance of the transaction and not, for example, upon
the locus of title, the form of the transaction or the fact that
the transaction is denominated as a ''lease''. The fact that the
lessee, upon compliance with the terms of the lease, becomes or has
the option to become the owner of the leased property for no
additional consideration or for nominal consideration indicates
that the transaction is a financing lease or lease intended as
security. In such cases, the lessor has no substantial interest in
the leased property at the expiration of the lease term. In
addition, the fact that the lessee assumes and discharges
substantially all the risks and obligations ordinarily attributed
to the outright ownership of the property is more indicative of a
financing transaction than of a true lease. The rental payments in
such cases are in substance payments of principal and interest
either on a loan secured by the leased real property or on the
purchase of the leased real property. See, e. g., Financial
Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 13 and SEC Reg. S-X, 17
C.F.R. sec. 210.3-16(q) (1977); cf. First National Bank of Chicago
v. Irving Trust Co., 74 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1934); and Albenda and
Lief, ''Net Lease Financing Transactions Under the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973,'' 30 Business Lawyer, 713 (1975).
Paragraph (8) is new. It tracks the landlord limitation on
damages provision in paragraph (7) for damages resulting from the
breach by the debtor of an employment contract, but limits the
recovery to the compensation reserved under an employment contract
for the year following the earlier of the date of the petition and
the termination of employment.
Subsection (c) requires the estimation of any claim liquidation
of which would unduly delay the closing of the estate, such as a
contingent claim, or any claim for which applicable law provides
only an equitable remedy, such as specific performance. This
subsection requires that all claims against the debtor be converted
into dollar amounts.
Subsection (d) is derived from present law. It requires
disallowance of a claim of a transferee of a voidable transfer in
toto if the transferee has not paid the amount or turned over the
property received as required under the sections under which the
transferee's liability arises.
Subsection (e) also derived from present law, requires
disallowance of the claim for reimbursement or contribution of a
codebtor, surety or guarantor of an obligation of the debtor,
unless the claim of the creditor on such obligation has been paid
in full. The provision prevents competition between a creditor and
his guarantor for the limited proceeds in the estate.
Subsection (f) specifies that ''involuntary gap'' creditors
receive the same treatment as prepetition creditors. Under the
allowance provisions of this subsection, knowledge of the
commencement of the case will be irrelevant. The claim is to be
allowed ''the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of
the filing of the petition.'' Under voluntary petition, proposed 11
U.S.C. 303(f), creditors must be permitted to deal with the debtor
and be assured that their claims will be paid. For purposes of
this subsection, ''creditors'' include governmental units holding
claims for tax liabilities incurred during the period after the
petition is filed and before the earlier of the order for relief or
appointment of a trustee.
Subsection (g) gives entities injured by the rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease, either under section 365 or
under a plan or reorganization, a prepetition claim for any
resulting damages, and requires that the injured entity be treated
as a prepetition creditor with respect to that claim.
Subsection (h) gives a transferee of a setoff that is recovered
by one trustee a prepetition claim for the amount recovered.
Subsection (i) answers the nonrecourse loan problem and gives the
creditor an unsecured claim for the difference between the value of
the collateral and the debt in response to the decision in Great
National Life Ins. Co. v. Pine Gate Associates, Ltd., Bankruptcy
Case No. B75-4345A (N.D.Ga. Sept. 16, 1977).
The bill, as reported, deletes a provision in the bill as
originally introduced (former sec. 502(i)) requiring a tax
authority to file a proof of claim for recapture of an investment
credit where, during title 11 proceedings, the trustee sells or
otherwise disposes of property before the title 11 case began. The
tax authority should not be required to submit a formal claim for a
taxable event (a sale or other disposition of the asset) of whose
occurrence the trustee necessarily knows better than the taxing
authority. For procedural purposes, the recapture of investment
credit is to be treated as an administrative expense, as to which
only a request for payment is required.
HOUSE REPORT NO. 95-595
Paragraph (9) (of subsec. (b)) requires disallowance of certain
employment tax claims. These relate to a Federal tax credit for
State unemployment insurance taxes which is disallowed if the State
tax is paid late. This paragraph disallows the Federal claim for
the tax the same as if the credit had been allowed in full on the
Federal return.
-REFTEXT-
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, referred to in subsec.
(b)(9), are set out in the Appendix to this title.
-MISC2-
AMENDMENTS
1994 - Subsec. (b)(9). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 213(a), added par.
(9).
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 304(h)(1), substituted
''507(a)(8)'' for ''507(a)(7)''.
1986 - Subsec. (b)(6)(A)(ii). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(f)(1),
substituted ''repossessed'' for ''reposessed''.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 257(j), inserted reference to
chapter 12.
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(f)(2), substituted
''507(a)(7)'' for ''507(a)(6)''.
1984 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(a), inserted
''general'' before ''partner''.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(1), (2), in provisions
preceding par. (1), inserted ''(e)(2),'' after ''subsections'' and
''in lawful currency of the United States'' after ''claim''.
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(3), substituted
''and'' for '', and unenforceable against''.
Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(5), inserted ''the''
after ''exceeds''.
Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(4), struck out par. (3) ''such claim
may be offset under section 553 of this title against a debt owing
to the debtor;'', and redesignated par. (4) as (3).
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(4), redesignated par.
(5) as (4). Former par. (4) redesignated (3).
Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(6), substituted
''such claim'' for ''the claim'' and struck out the comma after
''petition''.
Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(4), redesignated par. (6) as (5).
Former par. (5) redesignated (4).
Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(4), redesignated par.
(7) as (6). Former par. (6) redesignated (5).
Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(7)(A), inserted ''the
claim of an employee'' before ''for damages''.
Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(4), redesignated par. (8) as (7).
Former par. (7) redesignated (6).
Subsec. (b)(7)(A)(i). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(7)(B),
substituted ''or'' for ''and''.
Subsec. (b)(7)(B). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(7)(C), (D),
substituted ''any'' for ''the'' and inserted a comma after ''such
contract''.
Subsec. (b)(8), (9). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(b)(4), redesignated
par. (9) as (8). Former par. (8) redesignated (7).
Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(c)(1), inserted ''the''
before ''fixing'' and substituted ''administration'' for
''closing''.
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(c)(2), inserted ''right
to payment arising from a'' after ''any'' and struck out ''if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment'' after ''breach of
performance''.
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(d)(1), (2), in
provisions preceding subpar. (A) substituted '', (b), and (c)'' for
''and (b)'' and substituted ''or has secured'' for '', or has
secured,''.
Subsec. (e)(1)(B). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(d)(3), inserted ''or
disallowance'' after ''allowance''.
Subsec. (e)(1)(C). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(d)(4), substituted
''asserts a right of subrogation to the rights of such creditor''
for ''requests subrogation'' and struck out ''to the rights of such
creditor'' after ''of this title''.
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(e), substituted ''522'' for
''522(i)''.
Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 445(f), amended subsec. (j)
generally, inserting provisions relating to reconsideration of a
disallowed claim, and provisions relating to reconsideration of a
claim under this subsection.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-394 effective Oct. 22, 1994, and not
applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before
Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 of Pub. L. 103-394, set out as a
note under section 101 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1986 AMENDMENT
Amendment by section 257 of Pub. L. 99-554 effective 30 days
after Oct. 27, 1986, but not applicable to cases commenced under
this title before that date, see section 302(a), (c)(1) of Pub. L.
99-554, set out as a note under section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure.
Amendment by section 283 of Pub. L. 99-554 effective 30 days
after Oct. 27, 1986, see section 302(a) of Pub. L. 99-554.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 98-353 effective with respect to cases filed
90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98-353,
set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
-SECREF-
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 101, 106, 346, 501, 503,
506, 507, 509, 510, 522, 544, 723, 727, 901, 929, 944, 1111, 1114,
1126, 1141, 1228, 1305, 1328 of this title.
-CITE-
11 USC Sec. 503 01/06/03
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
-HEAD-
Sec. 503. Allowance of administrative expenses
-STATUTE-
(a) An entity may timely file a request for payment of an
administrative expense, or may tardily file such request if
permitted by the court for cause.
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed
administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under section
502(f) of this title, including -
(1)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for
services rendered after the commencement of the case;
(B) any tax -
(i) incurred by the estate, except a tax of a kind specified
in section 507(a)(8) of this title; or
(ii) attributable to an excessive allowance of a tentative
carryback adjustment that the estate received, whether the
taxable year to which such adjustment relates ended before or
after the commencement of the case; and
(C) any fine, penalty, or reduction in credit relating to a tax
of a kind specified in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph;
(2) compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a)
of this title;
(3) the actual, necessary expenses, other than compensation and
reimbursement specified in paragraph (4) of this subsection,
incurred by -
(A) a creditor that files a petition under section 303 of
this title;
(B) a creditor that recovers, after the court's approval, for
the benefit of the estate any property transferred or concealed
by the debtor;
(C) a creditor in connection with the prosecution of a
criminal offense relating to the case or to the business or
property of the debtor;
(D) a creditor, an indenture trustee, an equity security
holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity
security holders other than a committee appointed under section
1102 of this title, in making a substantial contribution in a
case under chapter 9 or 11 of this title;
(E) a custodian superseded under section 543 of this title,
and compensation for the services of such custodian; or
(F) a member of a committee appointed under section 1102 of
this title, if such expenses are incurred in the performance of
the duties of such committee;
(4) reasonable compensation for professional services rendered
by an attorney or an accountant of an entity whose expense is
allowable under paragraph (3) of this subsection, based on the
time, the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, and
the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this
title, and reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses incurred
by such attorney or accountant;
(5) reasonable compensation for services rendered by an
indenture trustee in making a substantial contribution in a case
under chapter 9 or 11 of this title, based on the time, the
nature, the extent, and the value of such services, and the cost
of comparable services other than in a case under this title; and
(6) the fees and mileage payable under chapter 119 of title 28.
-SOURCE-
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2581; Pub. L. 98-353, title
III, Sec. 446, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 374; Pub. L. 99-554, title
II, Sec. 283(g), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3117; Pub. L. 103-394,
title I, Sec. 110, title II, Sec. 213(c), title III, Sec.
304(h)(2), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4113, 4126, 4134.)
-MISC1-
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS
Section 503(a) of the House amendment represents a compromise
between similar provisions in the House bill and the Senate
amendment by leaving to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure the
determination of the location at which a request for payment of an
administrative expense may be filed. The preamble to section
503(b) of the House bill makes a similar change with respect to the
allowance of administrative expenses.
Section 503(b)(1) adopts the approach taken in the House bill as
modified by some provisions contained in the Senate amendment. The
preamble to section 503(b) makes clear that none of the paragraphs
of section 503(b) apply to claims or expenses of the kind specified
in section 502(f) that arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business or financial affairs and that arise during the gap between
the commencement of an involuntary case and the appointment of a
trustee or the order for relief, whichever first occurs. The
remainder of section 503(b) represents a compromise between H.R.
8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendments. Section
503(b)(3)(E) codifies present law in cases such as Randolph v.
Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, which accords administrative expense status
to services rendered by a prepetition custodian or other party to
the extent such services actually benefit the estate. Section
503(b)(4) of the House amendment conforms to the provision
contained in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and deletes language
contained in the Senate amendment providing a different standard of
compensation under section 330 of that amendment.
SENATE REPORT NO. 95-989
Subsection (a) of this section permits administrative expense
claimants to file with the court a request for payment of an
administrative expense. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will
specify the time, the form, and the method of such a filing.
Subsection (b) specifies the kinds of administrative expenses
that are allowable in a case under the bankruptcy code. The
subsection is derived mainly from section 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act (section 104(a)(1) of former title 11), with some changes. The
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,
including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered
after the order for relief, and any taxes on, measured by, or
withheld from such wages, salaries, or commissions, are allowable
as administrative expenses.
In general, administrative expenses include taxes which the
trustee incurs in administering the debtor's estate, including
taxes on capital gains from sales of property by the trustee and
taxes on income earned by the estate during the case. Interest on
tax liabilities and certain tax penalties incurred by the trustee
are also included in this first priority.
Taxes which the Internal Revenue Service may find due after
giving the trustee a so-called ''quickie'' tax refund and later
doing an audit of the refund are also payable as administrative
expenses. The tax code (title 26) permits the trustee of an estate
which suffers a net operating loss to carry back the loss against
an earlier profit year of the estate or of the debtor and to obtain
a tentative refund for the earlier year, subject, however, to a
later full audit of the loss which led to the refund. The bill, in
effect, requires the Internal Revenue Service to issue a tentative
refund to the trustee (whether the refund was applied for by the
debtor or by the trustee), but if the refund later proves to have
been erroneous in amount, the Service can request that the tax
attributable to the erroneous refund be payable by the estate as an
administrative expense.
Postpetition payments to an individual debtor for services
rendered to the estate are administrative expenses, and are not
property of the estate when received by the debtor. This situation
would most likely arise when the individual was a sole proprietor
and was employed by the estate to run the business after the
commencement of the case. An individual debtor in possession would
be so employed, for example. See Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 243 (1943).
Compensation and reimbursement awarded officers of the estate
under section 330 are allowable as administrative expenses.
Actual, necessary expenses, other than compensation of a
professional person, incurred by a creditor that files an
involuntary petition, by a creditor that recovers property for the
benefit of the estate, by a creditor that acts in connection with
the prosecution of a criminal offense relating to the case, by a
creditor, indenture, trustee, equity security holder, or committee
of creditors or equity security holders (other than official
committees) that makes a substantial contribution to a
reorganization or municipal debt adjustment case, or by a
superseded custodian, are all allowable administrative expenses.
The phrase ''substantial contribution in the case'' is derived from
Bankruptcy Act Sec. 242 and 243 (sections 642 and 643 of former
title 11). It does not require a contribution that leads to
confirmation of a plan, for in many cases, it will be a substantial
contribution if the person involved uncovers facts that would lead
to a denial of confirmation, such as fraud in connection with the
case.
Paragraph (4) permits reasonable compensation for professional
services rendered by an attorney or an accountant of an equity
whose expense is compensable under the previous paragraph.
Paragraph (5) permits reasonable compensation for an indenture
trustee in making a substantial contribution in a reorganization or
municipal debt adjustment case. Finally, paragraph (6) permits
witness fees and mileage as prescribed under chapter 119 (Sec. 2041
et seq.) of title 28.
AMENDMENTS
1994 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 213(c), inserted
''timely'' after ''may'' and '', or may tardily file such request
if permitted by the court for cause'' before period at end.
Subsec. (b)(1)(B)(i). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 304(h)(2),
substituted ''507(a)(8)'' for ''507(a)(7)''.
Subsec. (b)(3)(F). Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 110, added subpar. (F).
1986 - Subsec. (b)(1)(B)(i). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(g)(1),
substituted ''507(a)(7)'' for ''507(a)(6)''.
Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(g)(2), inserted ''and''
after ''title;''.
Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 99-554, Sec. 283(g)(3), substituted a
period for ''; and''.
1984 - Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(1), struck out the
comma after ''be allowed'' in provisions preceding par. (1).
Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(2), struck out the
comma after ''credit''.
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(3), inserted ''(a)''
after ''330''.
Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(4), inserted a comma
after ''paragraph (4) of this subsection''.
Subsec. (b)(3)(C). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(5), struck out the
comma after ''case''.
Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(6), struck out ''and''
after ''title;''.
Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 98-353, Sec. 446(7), substituted '';
and'' for period at end.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-394 effective Oct. 22, 1994, and not
applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before
Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 of Pub. L. 103-394, set out as a
note under section 101 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1986 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 99-554 effective 30 days after Oct. 27,
1986, see section 302(a) of Pub. L. 99-554, set out as a note under
section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 98-353 effective with respect to cases filed
90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98-353,
set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
-SECREF-
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 106, 346, 348, 361, 364,
365, 504, 507, 557, 726, 901, 922, 1114, 1205, 1226, 1228, 1326 of
this title; title 26 section 1398.
-CITE-
11 USC Sec. 504 01/06/03
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
-HEAD-
Sec. 504. Sharing of compensation
-STATUTE-
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
person receiving compensation or reimbursement under section
503(b)(2) or 503(b)(4) of this title may not share or agree to
share -
(1) any such compensation or reimbursement with another person;
or
(2) any compensation or reimbursement received by another
person under such sections.
(b)(1) A member, partner, or regular associate in a professional
association, corporation, or partnership may share compensation or
reimbursement received under section 503(b)(2) or 503(b)(4) of this
title with another member, partner, or regular associate in such
association, corporation, or partnership, and may share in any
compensation or reimbursement received under such sections by
another member, partner, or regular associate in such association,
corporation, or partnership.
(2) An attorney for a creditor that files a petition under
section 303 of this title may share compensation and reimbursement
received under section 503(b)(4) of this title with any other
attorney contributing to the services rendered or expenses incurred
by such creditor's attorney.
-SOURCE-
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2582.)
-MISC1-
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
SENATE REPORT NO. 95-989
Section 504 prohibits the sharing of compensation, or fee
splitting, among attorneys, other professionals, or trustees. The
section provides only two exceptions: partners or associates in the
same professional association, partnership, or corporation may
share compensation inter se; and attorneys for petitioning
creditors that join in a petition commencing an involuntary case
may share compensation.
-SECREF-
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 901 of this title; title
15 section 78fff.
-CITE-
11 USC Sec. 505 01/06/03
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 11 - BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 5 - CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE
SUBCHAPTER I - CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
-HEAD-
Sec. 505. Determination of tax liability
-STATUTE-
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection,
the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine
or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or
not previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not
contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
(2) The court may not so determine -
(A) the amount or legality of a tax, fine, penalty, or addition
to tax if such amount or legality was contested before and
adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under this
title; or
(B) any right of the estate to a tax refund, before the earlier
of -
(i) 120 days after the trustee properly requests such refund
from the governmental unit from which such refund is claimed;
or
(ii) a determination by such governmental unit of such
request.
(b) A trustee may request a determination of any unpaid liability
of the estate for any tax incurred during the administration of the
case by submitting a tax return for such tax and a request for such
a determination to the governmental unit charged with
responsibility for collection or determination of such tax. Unless
such return is fraudulent, or contains a material
misrepresentation, the trustee, the debtor, and any successor to
the debtor are discharged from any liability for such tax -
(1) upon payment of the tax shown on such return, if -
(A) such governmental unit does not notify the trustee,
within 60 days after such request, that such return has been
selected for examination; or
(B) such governmental unit does not complete such an
examination and notify the trustee of any tax due, within 180
days after such request or within such additional time as the
court, for cause, permits;
(2) upon payment of the tax determined by the court, after
notice and a hearing, after completion by such governmental unit
of such examination; or
(3) upon payment of the tax determined by such governmental
unit to be due.
(c) Notwithstanding section 362 of this title, after
determination by the court of a tax under this section, the
governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection of
such tax may assess such tax against the estate, the debtor, or a
successor to the debtor, as the case may be, subject to any
otherwise applicable law.
-SOURCE-
(Pub. L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2582; Pub. L. 98-353, title
III, Sec. 447, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 374.)
-MISC1-
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS
Section 505 of the House amendment adopts a compromise position
with respect to the determination of tax liability from the
position taken in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and in the
Senate amendment.
Determinations of tax liability: Authority of bankruptcy court to
rule on merits of tax claims. - The House amendment authorizes the
bankruptcy court to rule on the merits of any tax claim involving
an unpaid tax, fine, or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition
to a tax, of the debtor or the estate. This authority applies, in
general, whether or not the tax, penalty, fine, or addition to tax
had been previously assessed or paid. However, the bankruptcy
court will not have jurisdiction to rule on the merits of any tax
claim which has been previously adjudicated, in a contested
proceeding, before a court of competent jurisdiction. For this
purpose, a proceeding in the U.S. Tax Court is to be considered
''contested'' if the debtor filed a petition in the Tax Court by
the commencement of the case and the Internal Revenue Service had
filed an answer to the petition. Therefore, if a petition and
answer were filed in the Tax Court before the title II petition was
filed, and if the debtor later defaults in the Tax Court, then,
under res judicata principles, the bankruptcy court could not then
rule on the debtor's or the estate's liability for the same taxes.
The House amendment adopts the rule of the Senate bill that the
bankruptcy court can, under certain conditions, determine the
amount of tax refund claim by the trustee. Under the House
amendment, if the refund results from an offset or counterclaim to
a claim or request for payment by the Internal Revenue Service, or
other tax authority, the trustee would not first have to file an
administrative claim for refund with the tax authority.
However, if the trustee requests a refund in other situations, he
would first have to submit an administrative claim for the refund.
Under the House amendment, if the Internal Revenue Service, or
other tax authority does not rule on the refund claim within 120
days, then the bankruptcy court may rule on the merits of the
refund claim.
Under the Internal Revenue Code (title 26), a suit for refund of
Federal taxes cannot be filed until 6 months after a claim for
refund is filed with the Internal Revenue Service (sec. 6532(a)
(title 26)). Because of the bankruptcy aim to close the estate as
expeditiously as possible, the House amendment shortens to 120 days
the period for the Internal Revenue Service to decide the refund
claim.
The House amendment also adopts the substance of the Senate bill
rule permitting the bankruptcy court to determine the amount of any
penalty, whether punitive or pecuniary in nature, relating to taxes
over which it has jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the tax court in bankruptcy cases: The Senate
amendment provided a detailed series of rules concerning the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Tax Court, or similar State or local
administrative tribunal to determine personal tax liabilities of an
individual debtor. The House amendment deletes these specific
rules and relies on procedures to be derived from broad general
powers of the bankruptcy court.
Under the House amendment, as under present law, a corporation
seeking reorganization under chapter 11 is considered to be
personally before the bankruptcy court for purposes of giving that
court jurisdiction over the debtor's personal liability for a
nondischargeable tax.
The rules are more complex where the debtor is an individual
under chapter 7, 11, or 13. An individual debtor or the tax
authority can, as under section 17c of the present Bankruptcy Act
(section 35(c) of former title 11), file a request that the
bankruptcy court determine the debtor's personal liability for the
balance of any nondischargeable tax not satisfied from assets of
the estate. The House amendment intends to retain these procedures
and also adds a rule staying commencement or continuation of any
proceeding in the Tax Court after the bankruptcy petition is filed,
unless and until that stay is lifted by the bankruptcy judge under
section 362(a)(8). The House amendment also stays assessment as
well as collection of a prepetition claim against the debtor (sec.
362(a)(6)). A tax authority would not, however, be stayed from
issuing a deficiency notice during the bankruptcy case (sec.
(b)(7)) (sec. 362(b)(8)). The Senate amendment repealed the
existing authority of the Internal Revenue Service to make an
immediate assessment of taxes upon bankruptcy (sec. 6871(a) of the
code (title 26). See section 321 of the Senate bill. As indicated,
the substance of that provision, also affecting State and local
taxes, is contained in section 362(a)(6) of the House amendment.
The statute of limitations is tolled under the House amendment
while the bankruptcy case is pending.
Where no proceeding in the Tax Court is pending at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, the tax authority can, under
the House amendment, file a claim against the estate for a
prepetition tax liability and may also file a request that the
bankruptcy court hear arguments and decide the merits of an
individual debtor's personal liability for the balance of any
nondischargeable tax liability not satisfied from assets of the
estate. Bankruptcy terminology refers to the latter type of
request as a creditor's complaint to determine the dischargeability
of a debt. Where such a complaint is filed, the bankruptcy court
will have personal jurisdiction over an individual debtor, and the
debtor himself would have no access to the Tax Court, or to any
other court, to determine his personal liability for
nondischargeable taxes.
If a tax authority decides not to file a claim for taxes which
would typically occur where there are few, if any, assets in the
estate, normally the tax authority would also not request the
bankruptcy court to rule on the debtor's personal liability for a
nondischargeable tax. Under the House amendment, the tax authority
would then have to follow normal procedures in order to collect a
nondischargeable tax. For example, in the case of nondischargeable
Federal income taxes, the Internal Revenue Service would be
required to issue a deficiency notice to an individual debtor, and
the debtor could then file a petition in the Tax Court - or a
refund suit in a district court - as the forum in which to litigate
his personal liability for a nondischargeable tax.
Under the House amendment, as under present law, an individual
debtor can also file a complaint to determine dischargeability.
Consequently, where the tax authority does not file a claim or a
request that the bankruptcy court determine dischargeability of a
specific tax liability, the debtor could file such a request on his
own behalf, so that the bankruptcy court would then determine both
the validity of the claim against assets in the estate and also the
personal liability of the debtor for any nondischargeable tax.
Where a proceeding is pending in the Tax Court at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, the commencement of the
bankruptcy case automatically stays further action in the Tax Court
case unless and until the stay is lifted by the bankruptcy court.
The Senate amendment repealed a provision of the Internal Revenue
case barring a debtor from filing a petition in the Tax Court after
commencement of a bankruptcy case (sec. 6871(b) of the code (26
U.S.C. 6871(b))). See section 321 of the Senate bill. As indicated
earlier, the equivalent of the code amendment is embodied in
section 362(a)(8) of the House amendment, which automatically stays
commencement or continuation of any proceeding in the Tax Court
until the stay is lifted or the case is terminated. The stay will
permit sufficient time for the bankruptcy trustee to determine if
he desires to join the Tax Court proceeding on behalf of the
estate. Where the trustee chooses to join the Tax Court
proceeding, it is expected that he will seek permission to
intervene in the Tax Court case and then request that the stay on
the Tax Court proceeding be lifted. In such a case, the merits of
the tax liability will be determined by the Tax Court, and its
decision will bind both the individual debtor as to any taxes which
are nondischargeable and the trustee as to the tax claim against
the estate.
Where the trustee does not want to intervene in the Tax Court,
but an individual debtor wants to have the Tax Court determine the
amount of his personal liability for nondischargeable taxes, the
debtor can request the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay
on existing Tax Court proceedings. If the stay is lifted and the
Tax Court reaches its decision before the bankruptcy court's
decision on the tax claim against the estate, the decision of the
Tax Court would bind the bankruptcy court under principles of res
judicata because the decision of the Tax Court affected the
personal liability of the debtor. If the trustee does not wish to
subject the estate to the decision of the Tax Court if the latter
court decides the issues before the bankruptcy court rules, the
trustee could resist the lifting of the stay on the existing Tax
Court proceeding. If the Internal Revenue Service had issued a
deficiency notice to the debtor before the bankruptcy case began,
but as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition the 90-day period
for filing in the Tax Court was still running, the debtor would be
automatically stayed from filing a petition in the Tax Court. If
either the debtor or the Internal Revenue Service then files a
complaint to determine dischargeability in the bankruptcy court,
the decision of the bankruptcy court would bind both the debtor and
the Internal Revenue Service.
The bankruptcy judge could, however, lift the stay on the debtor
to allow him to petition the Tax Court, while reserving the right
to rule on the tax authority's claim against assets of the estate.
The bankruptcy court could also, upon request by the trustee,
authorize the trustee to intervene in the Tax Court for purposes of
having the estate also governed by the decision of the Tax Court.
In essence, under the House amendment, the bankruptcy judge will
have authority to determine which court will determine the merits
of the tax claim both as to claims against the estate and claims
against the debtor concerning his personal liability for
nondischargeable taxes. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service, or
a State or local tax authority, files a petition to determine
dischargeability, the bankruptcy judge can either rule on the
merits of the claim and continue the stay on any pending Tax Court
proceeding or lift the stay on the Tax Court and hold the
dischargeability complaint in abeyance. If he rules on the merits
of the complaint before the decision of the Tax Court is reached,
the bankruptcy court's decision would bind the debtor as to
nondischargeable taxes and the Tax Court would be governed by that
decision under principles of res judicata. If the bankruptcy judge
does not rule on the merits of the complaint before the decision of
the Tax Court is reached, the bankruptcy court will be bound by the
decision of the Tax Court as it affects the amount of any claim
against the debtor's estate.
If the Internal Revenue Service does not file a complaint to
determine dischargeability and the automatic stay on a pending Tax
Court proceeding is not lifted, the bankruptcy court could
determine the merits of any tax claim against the estate. That
decision will not bind the debtor personally because he would not
have been personally before the bankruptcy court unless the debtor
himself asks the bankruptcy court to rule on his personal
liability. In any such situation where no party filed a
dischargeability petition, the debtor would have access to the Tax
Court to determine his personal liability for a nondischargeable
tax debt. While the Tax Court in such a situation could take into
account the ruling of the bankruptcy court on claims against the
estate in deciding the debtor's personal liability, the bankruptcy
court's ruling would not bind the Tax Court under principles of res
judicata, because the debtor, in that situation, would not have
been personally before the bankruptcy court.
If neither the debtor nor the Internal Revenue Service files a
claim against the estate or a request to rule on the debtor's
personal liability, any pending tax court proceeding would be
stayed until the closing of the bankruptcy case, at which time the
stay on the tax court would cease and the tax court case could
continue for purposes of deciding the merits of the debtor's
personal liability for nondischargeable taxes.
Audit of trustee's returns: Under both bills, the bankruptcy
court could determine the amount of any administrative period
taxes. The Senate amendment, however, provided for an expedited
audit procedure, which was mandatory in some cases. The House
amendment (sec. 505(b)), adopts the provision of the House bill
allowing the trustee discretion in all cases whether to ask the
Internal Revenue Service, or State or local tax authority for a
prompt audit of his returns on behalf of the estate. The House
amendment, however, adopts the provision of the Senate bill
permitting a prompt audit only on the basis of tax returns filed by
the trustee for completed taxable periods. Procedures for a prompt
audit set forth in the Senate bill are also adopted in modified
form.
Under the procedure, before the case can be closed, the trustee
may request a tax audit by the local, State or Federal tax
authority of all tax returns filed by the trustee. The taxing
authority would have to notify the trustee and the bankruptcy court
within 60 days whether it accepts returns or desires to audit the
returns more fully. If an audit is conducted, the taxing authority
would have to notify the trustee of tax deficiency within 180 days
after the original request, subject to extensions of time if the
bankruptcy court approves. If the trustee does not agree with the
results of the audit, the trustee could ask the bankruptcy court to
resolve the dispute. Once the trustee's tax liability for
administration period taxes has thus been determined, the legal
effect in a case under chapter 7 or 11 would be to discharge the
trustee and any predecessor of the trustee, and also the debtor,
from any further liability for these taxes.
The prompt audit procedure would not be available with respect to
any tax liability as to which any return required to be filed on
behalf of the estate is not filed with the proper tax authority.
The House amendment also specifies that a discharge of the trustee
or the debtor which would otherwise occur will not be granted, or
will be void if the return filed on behalf of the estate reflects
fraud or material misrepresentation of facts.
For purposes of the above prompt audit procedures, it is intended
that the tax authority with which the request for audit is to be
filed is, as the Federal taxes, the office of the District Director
in the district where the bankruptcy case is pending.
Under the House amendment, if the trustee does not request a
prompt audit, the debtor would not be discharged from possible
transferee liability if any assets are returned to the debtor.
Assessment after decision: As indicated above, the commencement
of a bankruptcy case automatically stays assessment of any tax
(sec. 362(a)(6)). However, the House amendment provides (sec.
505(c)) that if the bankruptcy court renders a final judgment with
regard to any tax (under the rules discussed above), the tax
authority may then make an assessment (if permitted to do so under
otherwise applicable tax law) without waiting for termination of
the case or confirmation of a reorganization plan.
Trustee's authority to appeal tax cases: The equivalent provision
in the House bill (sec. 505(b)) and in the Senate bill (sec.
362(h)) authorizing the trustee to prosecute an appeal or review of
a tax case are deleted as unnecessary. Section 541(a) of the House
amendment provides that property of the estate is to include all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor. These interests
include the debtor's causes of action, so that the specific
provisions of the House and Senate bills are not needed.
SENATE REPORT NO. 95-989
Subsections (a) and (b) are derived, with only stylistic changes,
from section 2a(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act (section 11(a)(2A) of
former title 11). They permit determination by the bankruptcy court
of any unpaid tax liability of the debtor that has not been
contested before or adjudicated by a judicial or administrative
tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the bankruptcy case, and
the prosecution by the trustee of an appeal from an order of such a
body if the time for review or appeal has not expired before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. As under current Bankruptcy
Act Sec. 2a (2A), Arkansas Corporation Commissioner v. Thompson,
313 U.S. 132 (1941), remains good law to permit abstention where
uniformity of assessment is of significant importance.
Section (c) deals with procedures for obtaining a prompt audit of
tax returns filed by the trustee in a liquidation or reorganization
case. Under the bill as originally introduced, a trustee who is
''in doubt'' concerning tax liabilities of the estate incurred
during a title 11 proceeding could obtain a discharge from personal
liability for himself and the debtor (but not for the debtor or the
debtor's successor in a reorganization), provided that certain
administrative procedures were followed. The trustee could request
a prompt tax audit by the local, State, or Federal governmental
unit. The taxing authority would have to notify the trustee and
the court within sixty days whether it accepted the return or
desired to audit the returns more fully. If an audit were
conducted, the tax office would have to notify the trustee of any
tax deficiency within 4 months (subject to an extension of time if
the court approved). These procedures would apply only to tax
years completed on or before the case was closed and for which the
trustee had filed a tax return.
The committee bill eliminates the ''in doubt'' rule and makes
mandatory (rather than optional) the trustee's request for a prompt
audit of the estate's tax returns. In many cases, the trustee
could not be certain that his returns raised no doubt about
possible tax issues. In addition, it is desirable not to create a
situation where the taxing authority asserts a tax liability
against the debtor (as transferee of surplus assets, if any, return
to him) after the case is over; in any such situation, the debtor
would be called on to defend a tax return which he did not
prepare. Under the amendment, all disputes concerning these
returns are to be resolved by the bankruptcy court, and both the
trustee and the debtor himself do not then face potential
post-bankruptcy tax liabilities based on these returns. This
result would occur as to the debtor, however, only in a liquidation
case.
In a reorganization in which the debtor or a successor to the
debtor continues in existence, the trustee could obtain a discharge
from personal liability through the prompt audit procedure, but the
Treasury could still claim a deficiency against the debtor (or his
successor) for additional taxes due on returns filed during the
title 11 proceedings.
HOUSE REPORT NO. 95-595
Subsection (c) is new. It codifies in part the referee's
decision in In re Statmaster Corp., 465 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1972).
Its purpose is to protect the trustee from personal liability for a
tax falling on the estate that is not assessed until after the case
is closed. If necessary to permit expeditious closing of the case,
the court, on request of the trustee, must order the governmental
unit charged with the responsibility for collection or
determination of the tax to audit the trustee's return or be barred
from attempting later collection. The court will be required to
permit sufficient time to perform an audit, if the taxing authority
requests it. The final order of the court and the payment of the
tax determined in that order discharges the trustee, the debtor,
and any successor to the debtor from any further liability for the
tax. See Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws: Tax Procedures, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1360, 1423-42
(1975).
AMENDMENTS
1984 - Subsec. (a)(2
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Enviado por: | El remitente no desea revelar su nombre |
Idioma: | inglés |
País: | Estados Unidos |